India-Pakistan Ceasefire And Thereafter

India and Pakistan stepped back from the brink after days of fighting under what appears to be a ceasefire brokered by the United States. There has been an announcement, further, by Washington that the stage is set for talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral venue. This has not been denied by either New Delhi or Islamabad. The truce appears to be holding after some initial recalcitrance on the Pakistani side. Central to the de-escalation was the engagement of the US with the foreign ministers and national security advisors of both countries, leading to Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations calling his Indian counterpart and a cessation of hostilities. Another round of discussions between the DGMOs on May 12 is on the cards, which should help bring about a framework of regular and reliable military-to-military contacts at the appropriate levels. It is unclear at the moment how the talks at the unspecified neutral venue will evolve and move towards more intractable topics that have been hitherto considered bilateral. President Trump’s announcement that he intends to get into the resolution of Kashmir has not yet been met with the resistance such suggestions evoke in New Delhi, where there is a political consensus that disfavours any third-party role.

It remains to be seen how much headway President Trump’s initiative will make. His other notable and widely publicised effort at bringing peace between Ukraine and Russia remains very much a work in progress. After talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February, Trump said that America would work with India on a security agenda that includes terrorism. Trump’s pivot stands in contrast to US Vice President J.D. Vance’s comments that it was none of America’s business to get involved in the India-Pakistan face-off. This was interpreted as tacit acceptance of a retaliatory strike on Pakistan by India in response to Pahalgam, but it soon became clear that steady escalation was being looked at askance in the Western capitals, especially with all the G-7 members backing a quick and effective de-escalation between Islamabad and New Delhi. American secretary of state Marco Rubio, who also wears the hat of the national security adviser, seems to have played a crucial role in bringing about the easing of tensions.

By all accounts, India achieved its Operation Sindoor objectives when it bombed the first nine terrorist sites in Pakistan (Sialkot, Muridke and Bahawalpur) and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (Muzaffarabad, Kotli and Bhimber). The operation also battle-tested the Indian arsenal, which has been gradually transitioning to French and US hardware away from Russia, although the Russian-based air defence system S-400 has stood out in its ability to counter Pakistani air attacks, more than proving its mettle. But India cannot lose sight of a similar shift happening across the border, where Islamabad has been sourcing an estimated 81% of its military equipment from China since 2020, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Both countries claim to have thwarted each other’s drone attacks. With the latest experience and with remote technology propelling the way battles shape, India will now have to look to acquire appropriately to stay ahead. This is more imperative considering that New Delhi has to factor in a two-front scenario.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan’s ability to secure an immediate $1 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with US backing should compel India to strengthen its dossier on cross-border terrorism and make its arguments sharper and more persuasive. The Union government has held “Pakistani and Pakistan-trained terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Taiba” responsible for the dastardly attack on tourists at Pahalgam. What makes the mass murder of peaceful visitors different is the underlying intent to deepen religious divisions and provoke communal violence across India, while the Uri and Pulwama attacks were targeted at soldiers. If the operation at Balakot was a punitive strike on terrorism, it did not achieve deterrence. Hopefully this time it will be different.

While there is no clarity yet on the exact nature of the broad set of issues that both are said to be ready to discuss, it is presumable that talks on Kashmir are not on the cards as of now. Confidence-building measures on both sides, including renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty, would seem logical. After all, the two countries came up with the Treaty recognising the mutual economic benefit flowing from it, a factor that safeguarded it until recently. At the very least, an immediate, credible plan to end cross-border terrorism and root out the sanctuaries that these groups create for themselves in Pakistan-controlled territory must be agreed upon. There is, unfortunately, a sense of déjà vu when it comes to dealing with Pakistan on a variety of issues. It did not even think it fit to grant a Most Favoured Nation status on matters of trade, for example.

Resolving the fundamental differences of perception and otherwise over territory that go back to 1948 and the Line of Control requires tremendous pragmatism on both sides. Trump has tried to enthuse India and Pakistan with an expansive promise to raise levels of trade with both, something that only New Delhi is better placed to exploit, given the steady expansion of the economy. Pakistan, on the other hand, is politically unstable, and its limited economy is in a close embrace with China, which maintains a partnership to gain access to the Arabian Sea via port and infrastructure investments.